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A New Look at the Three World Classification*
Dudley Seers
A 'Three world' classification of nations has been
in use for the third quarter of this century in two
distinct respects. First, the structures of inter-
national organizations, (e.g. the committees of
UNCTAD') have been based on the three classes
of 'centrally planned', 'developed' and 'less
developed' or 'developing' countries, in the
odiously euphemistic language of the United
Nations (the last group has also been known as
the 'Third World'). Secondly, this classification
has helped to shape the way in which we perceive
and interpret international events.
I am going to look briefly at the basis and impli-
cations of this division, then at the way in which
it has been eroded by political and economic
trends in the last two decades, and conclude by
suggesting a classification which looks more
appropriate for the remainder of the century, with
some notes on its implications for national policy.
* * * *
The conventional classification has rested on two
criteriawhether a country is or is not 'Com-
munist', and secondly on its level of income (and
industrialisation). As a system its acceptability has
depended partly on the fact that it is convenient
to the parties concerned. Governments of
'developing' countries use it as a means of pressure
on the 'developed' to obtain commitments such as
the generalisation of preferences and aid targets,
etc. It is also convenient to the Communist bloc
that the main division encouraged the former
colonies to address their demands to the former
metropolitan countries. While the government of
'developed' countries found these demands irk-
some, they accepted, for various reasons, that they
did have some interest in helping the 'developing'
countries to become 'developed', in the foreseeable
future, without passing through a Communist
phase.
This international classification was consistent
with the Harrod-Domar national growth model.
It implied that a 'developing' country could, by
planning to raise its per capita national income,
achieve a more prestigious place in the world
* Based on seminars given at the Universities of Harvard and
Puerto Rico, and a contribution to a consultative meeting of the
United Nations University in Tokyo.
1 There are in fact four country committees in UNCTAD,
since separate ones operate for Latin America and the
Afro-Asia group. However, for many purposes these last meetjointly.
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order and greater economic independence. It led
to the Third World demands for capital, in
UNCTAD I, II and III, which was believed to be
a necessary, even almost sufficient, condition for
achieving this growth.
A common belief in the 1950s was that shelves
were full of the necessary technologies and the
Third World could simply help themselves. The
'developed' countries had solved their economic
and social problems and those of the Third World
could do the same if they followed in the former's
footsteps. Their task was easier than that of
countries which were industrialising in the 19th
century. If they invested enough and still did not
grow, this must be due to 'obstacles'religions,
traditional customs, family systems, linguistic
barriers, excessive fertility, etc., etc., which
hindered the operation of the various factor and
product markets.
The strategy for 'developing' countries, expressed
in 'development' plans, and Development Decade
documents, was therefore to grow by modernisa-
tion. Before long, hopefully, a modern standard
of living would be within everyone's reach. The
task of international organizations such as
UNCTAD was primarily to arrange the transfer
of resources to facilitate this; it was expressed in
targets for growth rates and for transfers of aid
and private capital, and resolutions about tariff
preferences, commodity prices, etc. The delega-
tions of 'developed' countries usually supported
these resolutions reluctantly and with little
intention of implementation.
The collapse of the model
In suggesting how this set of ideas, which
amounted to a model of world development, was
undermined, I have to generalise even more wildly.
Perhaps the most significant development was that
countries with sustained fast economic growth, as
high as 3-4 per cent in per capita terms, did not by
any means experience reductions in unemploy-
ment, inequality or poverty. Nor did they become
economically more independent.
Import substituting industrialization turned out to
reinforce imported styles of consumption enjoyed
by small minorities and to create new sorts of
dependence on capital, technology and inter-
mediate products from abroad. It also usually led
to some neglect of the agricultural sector and
therefore dependence on imported foodstuffs,
especially wheat; many countries which had been
traditionally cereal exporters became importers.
While these economic trends were undermining
the growth-centered ideological counterpart of the
three-world system, it was also being made
obsolete by other developments: first, a degree of
'convergence' between the communist and non-
communist worlds with some of the former
(such as Hungary) relying much more on
market forces, while state intervention and
nationalisation has spread in the latter. In any
case China and one or two other Communist
countries had broken their political alignment
with the Soviet Union and increasingly diverged
in political behaviour.
There has also been a growing fuzziness in the
boundary between the 'developed' and 'developing'
countries. Western Europe has been developing
into a 'developing area', showing characteristic
chronic payment difficulties, chronic unemploy-
ment and chronic inflation. More to the point,
Western Europe has itself increasingly been
importing technology and capital via transnational
companies. The impact of the word 'developed'
and its power to inspire emulation was weakened
by none of the 'developed' any longer seeing
themselves as paradigms. Nor do they have much
capital to spare after meeting the politically press-
ing demands of their own populations for ever
higher consumption levels.
This model of world development was further
weakened by the combined oil and food crises of
the last three years. In the first place, this exposed
the vulnerability of growth strategies based on
highly-mechanised industrialisation. Secondly, it
showed that there were other ways of obtaining
resources than waiting for the 'developed'
countries to provide capital. Thirdly, it cast a
considerable question mark against the possibility
of the whole world population reaching a modern
standard within the next couple of generations or
indeed ever. The world suddenly became a much
less benign place.
The question also now rises: how does one classify
Kuwait, which has the highest per capita income
in the world? If we describe Kuwait as more
'developed' than the United States this intuitively
seems absurd. Although it exports a great deal of
one saleable commodity, it is also weak in several
important respects. Its citizens are accustomed to
extremely comfortable consumption standards but
it has to import almost everything. Kuwait is a
town in the desert and produces practically no
food except vegetables. It has to import technology
for all sectors, even the petroleum industry. It has
nationalized the physical assets of the petroleum
companies but it cannot nationalize their main
assets, production technology and access to world
markets. It is still dependent on the flow of
expertise from abroad, even to extract its main
economic asset, oil. And it is also a country with
too small a population to defend itself (and the
Gulf is a politically unstable area). It also lacks
national unity: about half the resident population
are migrants from Palestine, India, Iran, Iraq, etc.,
who have taken jobs which could not be filled by
citizens.
The dimensions of dependence
A country is economically dependent on the rest
of the world to the degree that its production
structure does not match its consumption struc-
ture. It is a matter of consumption styles as well
as whether the country concerned can produce
locally the necessary inputs to sustain them.
To assess the nature and degree of a country's
dependence, simulate a situation in which it is cut
off from the outside world and therefore from its
normal sources of supply of oil, food and tech-
nology and ask what the consequences would be
of being cut off from them and how tolerable
these would be. It is not necessary for this to
happen or even for it to be a real possibility. The
potential consequences of autarchic policies put a
brake on its freedom of action. (In a primitive
community, such as a mining camp, a man's
relative physical strength does not have to be
tested in a fight for him to dominate other males.)
There are many economic inputs which it would
be painful to do withoutmetal ores, textile fibres,
etc. But clearly the most important are energy and
food, which means basically petroleum and
cereals.
Dependence is not only an economic concept.
Clearly the power a government exercises depends
also on the military force at its disposal. This too
is related to technology and especially the capacity
to produce its own weapons.
It is also related to population size, because this
affects the numbers in the armed forces, and (more
important and more directly) the numbers avail-
able to be mobilised in time of war. Size of
population is also relevant in other ways. At a
given level of income, it determines the size of the
market, which is in turn clearly related to the
structure of production, especially the size of the
sector producing capital equipment. It also affects
the number of research and development staff.
This in turn determines the level of technology
and the capacity to select imported techniques
appropriate to national needs.2
2 Of course to say that a large population is an asset to a
country is not to imply that population growth strengthens it.
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A country's size can also measured in terms of
area. This may also be an asset. A large country
is (as Russia has often shown) more capable of
absorbing and defeating invading armies. Since
oil and other natural resources are scattered more
or less randomly, the larger a country is (including
its territorial waters) the more likely it is to have
petroleum and metals, and also areas suitable for
growing cereals (though much, of course, depends
on climate, soil and technique as well). However it
is not necessarily helpful to a country to have a
large area, even a large arable area, if they have
to support a large population (India being the
classic case). Still for a large population to have a
limited arable area (as Japan has) is a definite
weakness.
Another type of dependence is politicalmilitary
alliances, political organisations, etc. Another
again is culturalimporting magazines, TV pro-
grammes, news agency material, etc., adapting
foreign fashions in everything from religions to
economic models, languages and styles of cloth-
ing.3 Political and cultural autonomy depend on
the degree of politico-cultural unity, reflecting
class differences and also ethnic and linguistic
heterogeneity, which have their roots in national
history, especially in the colonial period, when
settlers and immigrant labour often arrived.4 The
key question here is the extent to which a govern-
ment can appeal successfully to patriotism to
justify sacrifices.
If I only list these influences it is not because they
are unimportant, but because I want to propose a
manageable system of classification of countries
in a limited space. I could, however, go a step
further and suggest that while political and
(especially) cultural determinants of a govern-
ment's room to manoeuvre, are important, there
is a greater long-term reality to a country's
population and resource base.
A dependency classification
The table indicates for a number of countries the
degree of self-sufficiency in technology, cereals,
and oil. The fourth column shows size of popula-
tion. Certain features stand out from the table. In
the first place, the United States, the Soviet Union
and China, having large populations, are
militarily far more powerful than other countries
3 Another factor determining in some degree political and
cultural dependence is location, especially in relation to
countries which are more powerful in these respects.
4 Countries with large populations are usually far from
homogeneous. However in a very large country, the very
diversity of ethnic and linguistic groups may be a source of
strength, provided no single one is partially dominant. Ethnic
differences may be more important in small bi-racial countries
such as Malaysia and Singapore.
Area is not shown; population is a proxy for it (though a
weak one).
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and none of them entirely lack any of the three
key resources. They are each net importers of just
one of themthis is true only of these countries.
They would be the best able to withstand a break-
down of trade with the rest of the world (as
indeed they have in various ways demonstrated).
The Assets and Liabilities of Various Countries
Technology Cereals Oil Size
USA *** *
Soviet Union ** * *** ***
China * ** **l
Kuwait O O
Iran O *
o
**
1 Apparently turning into an export surplus.
2 Considerably larger than the others (c. 700 rn)
First three coiumns (resources)
Net exporterk* Approximately self-sufficient
* Net importer
O Virtually zero capacity.
Fourth column (population)
> 100
** 10-100m.
* l-10m.O <1m.
It would, however, be wrong to call them 'indepen-
dent'. Although they each have only one weakness,
it is serious. For the United States, it is oil (which
might in the long-term be overcome by the
development of shale coal and nuclear energy):
the US is also a net importer of iron ore and
other important metals. Cereals are the Achilles
heel of the Soviet Union (and to cure this would
apparently require a big and difficult reorganisa-
tion of the rural economy). The Chinese deficiency
is in technology including nuclear arms: this can
be made up more easily, suggesting their possible
emergence as the most independent country in a
few decades, especially since consumer aspirations
can presumably be more effectively restrained in
China than elsewhere, certainly than in the United
States.
All three would find autarchy uncomfortable.
Moreover they are dependent in other senses;
their military security requires neighbours which
are at least neutral. Some countries are currently
termed the 'least developed': let us call these
three the 'least dependent', to reflect their partial
but limited dependence.
Japan is often counted as a 'super power' and
certainly its per capita income is far higher than
that of China. It has a big population and exports
Japan ** * O
West Germany ** * O **
East Germany ** * o **
Brazil * * *
Cuba * * o
Costa Rica O * o *
technology (and thus capital equipment6) as well
as importing it. It has another great asset, which
does not appear on the table: a population more
homogeneous, ethnically and linguistically, than
that of almost any other country. Its social class
differences are severe and (unlike the three 'least
dependent' countries) a general strike against the
government within the next few years is not un-
thinkable. But a common culture is deeply rooted
in Japanese history and it could be argued that in
a politico-economic crisis its population would
show considerable cohesion. Still, if Japan were
cut off from the outside world it would crash to
destruction: imported oil is needed to enable the
population to keep warm, to communicate, to
move from one place to another (even to open
doors of buildings and raise people to their apart-
ments) and to produce and distribute other
necessities. Life styles would have to be drastically
changed if food imports were eliminated.
The structural pattern of West Germany is strik-
ingly similar, and with a few variations this could
be broadly taken as representative of the countries
of Western Europe too.7 They buy technology
(and also arms and equipment) from multinational
corporations based in the United States, but also
export these to other West European countries
and the rest of the world, via multinational private
or state corporations based in Western Europe.
They are mostly partially dependent on imported
cereals, and highly dependent on imported oil.8
To call them a separate group does not imply that
they will always co-operate in policy matters.
They do indeed have a collective interest in exert-
ing their combined bargaining power, vis-à-vis
the United States, oil exporters, etc. But, as
always, situations may develop which tempt
individual members of cartels to break away and
negotiate bilateral contracts.9
This approach to international analysis seems
more useful than the conventional one in explain-
ing the growing divergence of behaviour among
the governments of 'developed' countries, between
the United States and the others. The latter are
hardly even consulted any more on major US
initiatives.10 The emergence of a sellers' market in
6 Because of restrictions imposed after the war, Japan is not
a manufacturer of majcr military equipment such as war-
planes.
7 West Germany in one respect is not typicalit is highly
dependent on immigrant workers.8 EEC. would depend heavily on oil if it were a smgle
country, Of course it would have a large total population, but
could not be considered as irs the same 'least dependent'
class as the USA, the Soviet Unirn or China.9 This is especially likely to be true of Britain and Norway
because of their potential export capacity in oil.
lo It is true that there has also ben an additional reason, the
greater weight of pro-Israel political lobbies in the United
States than elsewhere, but this hardly appears sufilcient tojustify the go-it-alone policy of the US government.
cereals, and the increasing importance of tech-
nology, especially in the extraction of oil and
metals (including exploration offshore and by
satellite), means that United States interests differ
more profoundly from those of Western Europe
than previously, and that its bargaining strength
is much greater. The US government is clearly
determined to open new channels of negotiation
outside UNCTAD, to weaken OPEC and to reach
an arms agreement with the Soviet Union.
For some purposes it seems better to consider
Japan and the countries of Western Europe as a
separate class, which one might call 'semi-
dependent'. They are not unanimous in defending
multinational corporations when these are under
attack at UNCTAD (since they too are often
subject to heavy economic and political pressures
from US corporations) and they also have less
bargaining strength vis-à-vis countries exporting
primary products.
Analogous developments have occurred among
'Communist' countries. Differences between
resource patterns in Eastern European countries
on the one hand and in the Soviet Union on the
other have become increasingly important. So for
many purposes it may be more useful to class the
latter as 'semi-dependent' too. Apart from the
convergence in forms of economic organisation,
there is therefore an additional reason to suspect
a growing commonality of interest between
Western and Eastern Europe.
Another class of countries are also 'semi-depen-
dent', but in a different sensethe petroleum
exporters. The bigger members of OPEC, like
Iran, differ from the smaller ones, such as Kuwait,
in several important respects, notably the existence
of an agricultural hinterland and a much larger
population base. But they also all have much in
common. In complete contrast to Europe, they
have oil to trade for technology, arms and equip-
ment, and for manufactured imports to meet very
high consumer expectations. While the exportable
surplus of oil is only temporary, from an historical
perspective, for several decades many of them will
have interests different from those of other groups,
including the rest of the 'Third World'.1'
I have shown only a few non-OPEC 'developing'
countries in the table. Nearly all countries in
Africa, Asia and Latin America depend on im-
ported cereals and oil, and on imported tech-
nology. To buy these, they offer less essential
commodities such as coffee, tea, bananas, cocoa,
il In 1974, they were portrayed by some as almost another
world power (cg. in the doctrine of 'polycentricity'). How-
ever, the very euphoria cf that time has led to such
massive waste of resources that it is no longer even con-
ceivable to depict them in this way.
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sugar and cotton. (Some also have tourist facili-
ties.) They can therefore truly be termed
'dependent' countries. This dependence is mani-
fested in a basically passive attitude to foreign
investment. 12
Since they also share with OPEC members a
chronic reliance on imported technology, equip-
ment and arms, there is an economic rationale in
the continuance of the 'Third World' as an entity,
in support of the New International Economic
Order.'3 This has been reinforced by the use of
part of oil revenue as aid. The political basis is a
persisting determination to revenge humiliations
suffered in the colonial period and to achieve
respectable world status.
The communist-capitalist split also continues to
have organisational and ideological reality,14 so
the 'Three World' classification still has some life
left But one must expect an acceleration in the
fragmentation of the three worlds and the grow-
ing importance of geographical and social factors.
This will become more evident when the recession
is succeeded by a new phase of rapid expansion,
raising world income well above the 1973/4 peak
and revealing crucial supply difficulties again.
Indeed another world cereal shortage has
apparently emerged already, before the recession
is over. In the l980s and 90s, population pressure
will allow little relief from resource problems.
Policies for a less benign world
Finally, a few words on the national development
policies that would be compatible with this
approach. First, there are no fundamental differ-
ences in the strategies appropriate to the govern-
ments of 'centrally planned', 'developed' and
'developing' countries. The crucial task for every
government is to develop technical expertise and
to control consumer aspirations. For all of them,
though in different ways, what were thought of as
'obstacles' to development when this was synony-
mous with economic growth - nationalism,
separate languages, traditional customs, etc.-
12 Typically the capital of a dependent country is beseiged by
visiting business men with investment projects.13 The NIBO is however ambivalent, as perhaps is to be
expected in a period of rapid transition. On the one hand
it stresses the rights to national ownership of natural re-
sources and to form sellers' cartels; on the other, it is still
concerned with the continuation of inflows of capital and
technology. One might put it that underlying a cry of "rape"
is a low murmur: "But for God's sake don't stop yet".
14 The dependence of many governments is not a general
dependence on the outside world as a whole, but specifi-
cally towards one or two others, usually United States or
the Soviet Union. An ideological division has been rein-
forced by links in trade and also culture. In fact the
ideological distinction is becoming of decreasing relevance.
If the Soviet Union were to become capitalist (or, for that
matter, the United States experienced a communist revolu-
tion) it would not make a great deal of difference to the
world structure: all governments must use their bargaining
power as best they can to protect the consumption standards
of their own populations.
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appear rather as shields against modern consump-
tion styles and technologies which cannot be
afforded by more than a minority of the popula-
tions, and which increase dependence. Outside the
'least developed' countries, the universal need is
for sufficient technical and administrative capacity
to screen the importation of production and con-
sumption techniques, and monitor those which
have been allowed into the country.
lt follows that a planning office should no longer
be primarily concerned with growth targets or
with projects, but with creating the cadres capable
of evolving and implementing a development
strategy expressed in targets for key resources and
styles of consumption. Its second priority would
be building up the information needed to back
such a strategy, especially in negotiations with
foreign firms and governmentsinformation on
the range of technologies available internationally,
on the cost of different ways of obtaining them,
etc.
In order to support these strategies, a develop-
ment plan will also need to devote substantial
resources to reinforcing nationalism - e.g.,
strengthening national and religious organisations;
preserving and developing shrines and monuments,
supporting traditional crafts, etc. Another require-
ment is adequate armed forces and a development
plan needs to indicate their optimal size in relation
to other safeguards of independence.
Measures to check the waste of key resources
would in themselves do something to check social
polarization. But in addition, many governments
may well need more purposive policies to elimin-
ate inequalities based on social classes, race or
region, and acute poverty, if they are to achieve
the national unity necessary to back national
policies in technology and resource exploitation.'5
This points to the need, on these grounds alone,
for policies of redistributing property and income.
Lowering the concentration of income would
reduce demand for imported technology and oil
(though possibly raising the demand for imported
cereals).
Governments which lack the political basis for
this may well face serious crises.'6 It also points to
the need for technology policies that reconcile the
objectives of spreading employment and income
with the fast development of key sectors.
There are implications for aid lobbies in the less
dependent countries. In a world of slower
15 This is already the guiding philosophy of the development
plans of Malaysia. Of course, in some synthetic countries, the
region may be, especially for its inhabitants, the natural focus
of loyalty and planning.
16 This reinforces in fact the need for introducing distributive
targets, already felt in 1960s because of the social distørtions
of purely growth-oriented strategies.
economic growth there is less prospect than ever
of liberal internationalism, based on feelings of
guilt, being an effective force in the redistribution
of world income. The primary function of lobby-
ing governments before, e.g., UNCTAD is no
longer an endless and essentially vain battle to
shift a little more resources so as to raise
marginally the growth rate of 'developing'
countries. it is to stimulate delegations to find
ways of reconciling the needs of countries with
various resource patterns, so that international
strategies and initiatives can be developed in key
fields, especially energy and food.
in brief, recent developments have undermined the
belief in an essentially benign world, in which
nationalism was seen as an archaic but disappear-
¡ng impediment to modernization and social
change. It is now more obvious than ever that no
'international order' will survive unless it is based
on an acceptance of realities, namely the basic
interests of countries of all types.
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